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Introduction
The purpose of the present paper is fairly straightforward. We want to show that institutional reforms, such as the adoption of a conduct code, represent a necessary albeit insufficient condition to curb corruption and promote good governance. As several scholars have pointed out the success of institutional reform in general and the success of codes of conduct in particular depends, among other things, on ideational conditions.
With regard to codes of conduct, parliamentary ethics experts believe in fact that the success of a code of conduct depends on whether the individuals who are supposed to be regulated by the disposition of the code, have a common understanding of what are the problems that the code is supposed to address or of how the code can solve those problems. In other words, it is argued that the success of codes of conduct for Parliamentarians requires homogenous ethical standards and expectations. On the basis of a survey conducted among the members of the ethics council of the Indonesian DPD and DPR, we show that values and preferences of Indonesian MPs are far from being homogenous. Hence, we suggest that in order to make conduct codes successful in Indonesia, it is necessary to homogenize the ethical standards, values and expectations of Indonesian parliamentarians.
In the course of the paper we proceed as follows. In the first part of the paper, we summarize how the institutional approach to the study of politics has evolved over the years. Specifically we note that in contrast to classical institutionalist arguments, for which political outcomes were somewhat mechanistically determined by institutional arrangements, neo-institutional arguments underline that the relationship between institutions and political outcome is conditional as it depends on a variety of conditions such as actors' constellation, political will or ideas. Building on this ideational variant of neo-institutionalist arguments, we go on to say that ideational conditions are important for the success of conduct codes. In fact, as the literature has repeatedly observed, the success of conduct codes depends more on whether MPs have homogenous values, preferences and expectations than on whether the code establish severe sanctions.
In the second part of the paper, we discuss the Indonesian case. In doing so, we
show that in spite of the Indonesian transition to democracy, Indonesia's democracy is not characterized by particularly high levels of good governance. On the basis of survey data collected by Transparency International and the World Value Survey we show that the Indonesian political system is perceived to be very corrupt and that Indonesian citizens have very little trust in Indonesian institutions. We use this evidence to explain why the DPR and the DPD have taken some steps, such as the adoption of ethics code, and are willing to take some more steps, such as the adoption of a conduct code, to curb corruption. We conclude this part of the paper by arguing that while enacting ethics reforms is necessary, it may not be sufficient to promote good governance. If ideational institutionalists are correct in saying that the success of conduct codes depends on whether the ethical standards are homogenous (or not), then we need to know whether this condition is satisfied (or not) in the Indonesian case.
In the third part of the paper we present the results of a survey conducted among the members of the ethics council of the DPD and the DPR. The data analysis reveals that there is a plurality of ethical standards among Indonesian parliamentarians and this may represent an obstacle for the success of the ethics reforms.
In the conclusions, we suggest that in order to make ethics reforms succeed in addition to adopting codes of conduct and similar institutional arrangements, it is also necessary to homogenize the ethical standards and expectations of the Indonesian parliamentarians.
Part I. Institutionalisms
Long neglected in political science literature, institutions have received a considerable amount of attention in the course of the past two decades. Rational choice scholars (Tsebelis, 2003) view institutions as those mechanisms that translate individual preferences (micro) into social equilibria (macro). Historical institutionalists (Steinmo et alii, 1993) believe instead that institutions are not simply mechanisms for translating individual preferences into social equilibria, but believe instead that institutions actually contribute to the formation of individual preferences. The single most important factor that contributed to the rediscovery of political institutions in general and of constitutions/constitutional mechanisms in particular was the so called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991 In fact, in spite of the fact that the cultural factor is associated with respectively interpretation, political culture or religiosity/spirituality, all these studies posit a link between cultural conditions and institutional success (the success of the code in curbing corruption and promoting good governance). This linkage was most forcefully suggested in a study by Skelcher and Snape (2001) . These scholars argued in fact that the success of The data collected by Transparency International are presented in table 1. The data reveal that Indonesia is consistently perceived to be a very corrupt society. In fact, the CPI for Indonesia has never been higher than 3. A simple comparison allows us to understand what it means having such a low score. Regardless of the number of countries being sampled worldwide, Indonesia has always ranked among the most corrupt societies in the world. Leaving aside 1995 when Indonesia was perceived to be the single most corrupt of the 41 polities for which data had been collected, Indonesia is consistently viewed as a more corrupt than most societies. In seven years out of ten in the 1996-2005 period Indonesia was at least in the 90 th percentile while in the other three years it was at least in the 80 th . This means that in the years in which Indonesia was perceived to do better in comparative term, it was still regarded as more corrupt than 80 percent of the countries 4 The CPI is measured on a 10-point scale between where 0 indicates highly corrupt and where 10 indicates instead highly clean, see [http://ww1.transparency.org/].
for which Transparency International was collecting data. In the years in which Indonesia was perceived to do worse in comparative terms, Indonesia was perceived to more corrupt than 90 percent of the countries covered by Transparency International. Of course one should keep in mind that the CPI estimated by Transparency International does not really measure objective corruption, it provides an indication of how much corruption is perceived to exist in a country and as such they do not provide the best possible ground for making cross-country comparisons. Yet, these data all point in the same direction, namely that Indonesia is perceived to be very corrupt, that corruption represents a major problem in Indonesian politics in and by itself, and that corruption may be problematic as it is associated with falling levels of trust. 5 In sum, corruption is perceived to be a serious problem in Indonesia and this is why it is so important to take some steps to curb and possibly eliminate corruption (along with other forms of misconduct).
Transparency International developed another important tool (the Corruption
Barometer) to assess the severity of corruption within institutions and its impact on the level of trust citizens have in these institutions. 6 The list of institutions includes parliaments, political parties, the military and judiciary. In 36 out of 62 countries surveyed, political parties were rated by the general public as the institution most affected by corruption; but Indonesia's civil society sentiments differed from this findings. 5 We will elaborate this point in greater detail later on in the paper. 6 Respondents were asked to rank on a five point scale the extent to which they perceived various institutional sectors to be affected by corruption. Survey, 1981 -2004 (Country: Indonesia, 2001 About a thousand respondents were interviewed in Indonesia by the World Value Survey.
Respondents were asked to express on a 4 point scale -from 1 (great deal of confidence) to 4 (none at all)-how much confidence they had in 15 private, public and regional institutions. Since Indonesia was slowly recovering from the Asian Financial Crisis and was struggling to consolidate its new form of "democracy" after the Suharto years in 2001, it comes as no surprise that the Indonesian respondents were still wary of such large institutions that were still regarded as both inefficient and corrupt. To sum up, what we have said so far suggests three basic conclusions, namely that : 1) Indonesia has consistently been perceived to be highly corrupt and to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world;
2) The parliament (along with parties) is perceived to be the most corrupt institution in Indonesia; and
3) The Parliament is one of the three least trusted institutions in Indonesia.
One solution to regain citizens' trust consists in enacting ethics reforms and creating ethics regime. This means that a political system which is (or is at least perceived to be) corrupt implements some institutional reforms to reduce corruption and regain the trust of the citizens. This is why ethics reforms and the creation of ethics regimes are said to perform both an internal as well as an external function. Given the persistently high levels of perceived corruption and the low levels of trust in institution, the Indonesian legislature was forced to take some steps in order to curb corruption, to show its commitment to the principles and the values of good governance and to regain the trust of its citizens. The Indonesian parliament tried to do so by enacting some ethics reforms. The DPR (lower house) adopted a code of ethics on The DPD has already taken a more entrepreneurial approach with regard to the adoption of a conduct code. In fact, in spite of the fact that the ethics council of the DPD does not have the constitutional mandate to draft legislation, the ethics council has already prepared a draft of a code of conduct to manifest its commitment to ethics reforms and good governance. In order to examine sentiments towards corruption of the members of the DPD and the DPR we conducted a survey on "General Sentiments on Corruption". 10 In this survey we used a questionnaire that had originally been devised by Mancuso (1993; 1995) to investigate the ethical world of British MPs. We decided to use this questionnaire for two reasons. The first reason is that we believe that such a questionnaire allows the analyst to gain some insight into the ethical values and preferences of parliamentarians. The second reasons is that by adopting Mancuso' s questionnaire, we are able to generate that may be used for cross-country comparisons which, we believe, may help shed some light into the 10 The survey of the member of the ethics council of the DPR was administered in the course of a workshop on parliamentary ethics and codes of conduct organized by the National Democratic Institute. The survey was administered to the members of the ethics council of the DPD by Indraneel Datta of IDEA. We wish to thank IDEA, NDI, Indraneel Datta and Tom Cormier for all their help and support. We wish to thank Rick Stapenhurst who made all this possible.
ethical standards of parliamentarians and into how these standards may determine the success or the failure of ethics reforms.
Be that as it may, in this part of the survey (six questions), respondents were required to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement to each of the six statements, ranging on a 7 point scale from 1 (Strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). Indonesian parliamentarians believe that corruption can be eliminated, that is more widespread at the national than at the local level, that politicians are more corrupt than business people, that corruption reflects a society's ethical standards, and that corruption is indeed a major problem in Indonesia. Given these answers one could note that if corruption is a problem that can be solved and if corruption reflects a society's standards, then political elites in Indonesia in addition to implementing ethics reforms should also take some steps to educate the public and to modify/improve society's ethical preferences and values. But we need to make a second and more important remark, namely that the data analysis reveals that the ethical standards among the member of the ethics council in the DPD and in the DPR are not homogenous. Most of the respondents view political corruption as a widespread problem and agree dishonesty is more common in politics than in business, but the agreement on these issues is far from being unanimous.
The answers, as we mentioned earlier on in the paper, are given on a seven-point scale. Value 1 indicates strong agreement, value 7 indicates strong disagreement and value 4 indicates that a respondent is neutral about a given issue. To assess how much disagreement there is on the six issues on which respondents were asked to express their views, we proceed as follows. We discount all the answers in the neutral category, we add up all the answers indicating agreement (however strong), and we ad all the answers indicating disagreement (however strong). By doing so, we find that there is some disagreement on most issues and that on some issues disagreement is quite pervasive.
About 55 percent of the respondents agree that political corruption is widespread, but more than 22 percent of them disagrees with that view. About 44 percent of the respondents agree that the reason why voters do not trust politicians is that they do not understand politics, but this view is opposed by 37 percent of the respondents. In other words, members of the ethics council in the DPD and in the DPR are almost evenly split on this issue. About 65 percent of the respondents agree that dishonesty is more widespread in politics than in business, but 18 percent of them actually disagrees. About 70 percent of the respondents regard hiring the wife or a relative as personal secretary as a corrupt action, while this behavior is regard as perfectly legitimate by more than 20 percent of the respondents.
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For more than 50 percent of the respondents corruption is more common at the national level, while almost 15 percent of the respondents holds the opposite view.
Opinions differ also as to whether corruption can be eliminated. In fact, while 55.5 percent of the respondents believe that corruption can be eliminated, about 26 percent of the respondents holds the opposite view. To further examine the opinions of the respondents, we calculated the degree of polarization possibly arising towards these six statements. Building upon the work of [{strongly agree + strongly disagree} -neutral]
By applying this simple formula to the data presented in Table 4 , we are able to establish the polarization of respondents' views towards general statements of corruption as shown in Table 5 . From these computations, we find that polarization of views among parliamentarians ranges from 11 to 37 percent for only five issues. The fourth scenario stating that "corruption is more widespread at local than national level" was proven to be one of the least contentious issues among respondents regarding this survey, with a score of -3.7percent on the polarization index. The highest level of polarization, and , therefore, the greatest amount of disagreement, was recorded on whether corruption can or cannot be eliminated. The second most contentious item was whether dishonesty is more common in politics or in business Respondents were equally polarized as to whether political corruption is a widespread phenomenon and as to whether corruption reflects the ethical standards of a society. The polarization in each of these four scenarios was higher than 25 percent. These results suggest that the ethical attitudes and perspectives of Indonesian parliamentarians are far from homogenous. Without a homogenous set of ethical perspectives and values, it is very difficult to make conduct codes succeed in the long term. In order to ensure such success, the ethical standards of Indonesian parliamentarians must be homogenized, reducing possible polarization of opinions on ethical issues.
In order to properly assess how homogenous were the ethical standards of the Indonesian MPs, respondents were also provided with 10 corruption scenarios and were asked to rank each of these scenarios on a 7 point scale where 1 meant corrupt and 7 meant non corrupt.
Data analysis reveals that 8 of the 10 scenarios were considered as corrupt scenarios by the respondents, who however regarded accepting cigars from wealthy constituents and arranging meetings between MPs and businessmen as non-corrupt practices.
The data analysis also reveals that there is a quite a bit of disagreement among influence to get a friend a job does not represent a corrupt behavior. Even more surprisingly 3.7 of the respondents did not regard awarding a public contract to a company that had made major donations to party finance as a corrupt action. Once again, by applying the Pelizzo-Babones index of polarization 12 index to the data presented in Table 6 , we are able to analyze the polarization of Indonesian parliamentarians' responses towards various corruption scenarios. On close analysis of the computations reflected in Table 7 , the spectrum of polarization ranges from a minimum of about 7 percent to a maximum of about 74 percent. Indeed, the wide range 12 The Polarization Index: [(extreme left + extreme right) -centre], on this index see Pelizzo and Babones (2003) as well as Pelizzo and Babones (2006 should be put in the code to address those problems, the data that we have presented clearly indicate that these conditions are not met in the Indonesian case.
Conclusions
The purpose of the paper was to discuss the problems and perspectives concerning the adoption of ethics reforms in Indonesia. In doing so, we have argued that while political scientists believe that political outcomes are affected by political institutions, they indicate that the relationship between institutions and political outcomes is conditional.
Institutions' ability to produce a certain outcome depends on a variety of conditions such as political will, actors' constellations, as well as ideational factors.
whether the individuals that the code is supposed to regulate have common values, have a common understanding of the problems that the code is intended to solve, and have a common understanding of what measures can be adopted to fix those problems.
Given the high level of perceived corruption in Indonesia and the lack of trust in the parliament, Indonesian politicians are doing exactly what they are supposed to do:
they have tried and they are trying to enact ethics reforms to show their commitment to the principles of good governance, to curb corruption and to regain citizens' trust. In order to do so, the DPR adopted an ethics code in 2004 and now both the DPD and the DPR are trying to adopt a conduct code to regulate the behavior of their members. This obviously represents a step in the right direction. Conduct codes have a greater power to regulate the behavior of parliamentarians than ethics codes. Codes of conduct are prescriptive rather than aspirational (Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2004; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2006:195-203; Pasquino and Pelizzo, 2006) , as in addition to stating the ethical principles and values of the institution, they provide clear guidance to the members and establishes sanctions for the violations of the code itself.
This said, it is important to keep in mind that the function of a conduct code is not to punish wrong-doers, but it is to prevent corruption and other forms of misconduct.
Hence, ideational factors, such as the fact that MPs have a common value system, are more important than sanctions.
The survey data that we have analyzed and discussed in the paper clearly show that the ethical views of Indonesian legislators are not homogenous. There is quite a bit of disagreement among Indonesian legislators as to how widespread corruption is, as to what represent corruption and so on. Hence, while discussing the adoption of (and adopting) a code of conduct may prove extremely useful to curb corruption, and restore citizens' trust in the Indonesian legislature, it is by itself insufficient. In drafting the code or, better, before drafting the code, Indonesian legislators should discuss what factors are responsible for not so good governance, what are the main problems plaguing the Indonesian political system, which of these problems can and should be addressed by the code, how specific the dispositions of the code should be, and how these dispositions can help Indonesia achieve better governance.
